On Terri Schiavo and personhood
Something occurred to me that seems to have great bearing on whether or not Terri Schiavo was truly a person during the last fifteen years of her life.
Since her cognitive function was allegedly zero, it has been argued that Terri was not a person. But if one literally loses one’s mind, must one’s personhood go with it? I find such a conclusion suspect. In my mind, mere existence is enough to qualify one for personhood.
Consider this: Terri’s cognitive function was minimal at best, yet her body continued to function. She breathed on her own, her heart pumped blood, and she metabolized the food and water she received through a tube. She also had regular menstrual periods. It’s probably safe to say she ovulated as well, meaning that she was fertile. If she was fertile, then it would have been possible for her to conceive -- and conceivable that she could’ve given birth to a child.
Which leads to my question: can an individual procreate, i.e., co-create new life, and yet still not be a person? If not, then why? Can a fertile individual produce anything of greater worth than another human being? I suppose some could say that it’s worthier to win a soul to heaven than to merely produce another human life. But if a life hasn’t been produced to begin with, how can it possibly acquire a soul to be won to heaven?
Acceptance of salvation is an act of volition, as is bearing witness to God’s saving grace beyond the natural effect of salvation. The killing of another human being is also an act of volition. But no one can will the dead to life. A person can create new life via his or her body together with another, but only because God has made the human body to possess this capacity. No one would be here if that capacity was not inherent. If no one existed, no one could possess the capacity to choose. No one could achieve anything at all. Therefore, the prerequisite to cognitive function, of the type that produces acts of will, must be mere existence itself.
If no one can control the fact that he or she is alive (besides the fact that he/she can choose to terminate his/her life), then how can anyone possibly be so arrogant as to say that the value of life lies in what can be accomplished (via the will)? Besides, is not the greatest achievement that which is accomplished for others? A person with no cognitive function whatever can still achieve for others: he or she can accomplish the work of compassion, forbearance, reverence, and a host of other qualities within the hearts of those who are willing to receive them.
If Terri was capable of procreation, and if she was capable of instilling virtue in the hearts of those who were willing to accept it, then surely she possessed personhood.
Since her cognitive function was allegedly zero, it has been argued that Terri was not a person. But if one literally loses one’s mind, must one’s personhood go with it? I find such a conclusion suspect. In my mind, mere existence is enough to qualify one for personhood.
Consider this: Terri’s cognitive function was minimal at best, yet her body continued to function. She breathed on her own, her heart pumped blood, and she metabolized the food and water she received through a tube. She also had regular menstrual periods. It’s probably safe to say she ovulated as well, meaning that she was fertile. If she was fertile, then it would have been possible for her to conceive -- and conceivable that she could’ve given birth to a child.
Which leads to my question: can an individual procreate, i.e., co-create new life, and yet still not be a person? If not, then why? Can a fertile individual produce anything of greater worth than another human being? I suppose some could say that it’s worthier to win a soul to heaven than to merely produce another human life. But if a life hasn’t been produced to begin with, how can it possibly acquire a soul to be won to heaven?
Acceptance of salvation is an act of volition, as is bearing witness to God’s saving grace beyond the natural effect of salvation. The killing of another human being is also an act of volition. But no one can will the dead to life. A person can create new life via his or her body together with another, but only because God has made the human body to possess this capacity. No one would be here if that capacity was not inherent. If no one existed, no one could possess the capacity to choose. No one could achieve anything at all. Therefore, the prerequisite to cognitive function, of the type that produces acts of will, must be mere existence itself.
If no one can control the fact that he or she is alive (besides the fact that he/she can choose to terminate his/her life), then how can anyone possibly be so arrogant as to say that the value of life lies in what can be accomplished (via the will)? Besides, is not the greatest achievement that which is accomplished for others? A person with no cognitive function whatever can still achieve for others: he or she can accomplish the work of compassion, forbearance, reverence, and a host of other qualities within the hearts of those who are willing to receive them.
If Terri was capable of procreation, and if she was capable of instilling virtue in the hearts of those who were willing to accept it, then surely she possessed personhood.
posted by Bonnie at
11:06 PM
5 Comments:
Good work. In order to answer your question, we must first define personhood, which is, of course, one of the bones of contention. You have thoughtfully pointed out some of the attributes of a person.
At least for males, it is clearly possible for the dead to reproduce (in one sense, anyway) if their sperm was deposited in a bank.
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Martin LaBar, at 4:22 AM
I like the trend of your thinking... and in looking at the comments, it seems obvious that we are increasingly attached to a dichotomy of body/soul idea rather than a holistic idea of what 'human' is.
Our pivot point is always going to hinge on "usefulness" vs. our ideas of instrinsic worth.
Here's one to think about: if Terri wasn't a person and most of her organs were in good working order- could harvesting from these people be considered acceptable? Is that next?
People think that is far out, but we are a good ways into 'far-out' territory ...
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IlonaGarden, at 7:14 PM
Great comments. Thanks!
This is a big, gnarly subject, that's for sure.
Marla, I think I may have commented on your blog about differentiating between a person who is clearly in decline (dying) vs. a healthy yet handicapped person, as far as keeping them alive goes. Not that that's always a clear line but I think it's a good guideline.
Martin -- whoa! Now even the dead are people too! Seriously, it is strange that a person's gametes can outlive them...
Paul: I tried to head off any such assumption by asking, "Can a fertile individual produce anything of greater worth than another human being?" Obviously, an infertile person has a different call.
I didn't saying anything about a "difficult" person not being a person due to their difficultness; indeed, even the difficult person is used by God to bring about all sorts of fruit: patience, forbearance, grace, mercy, compassion, etc. (not necessarily in that order ;-) ). That's what redemption is about.
As to your guage of personhood, you bring up valid distinctions but I think you may be confusing those qualities which make us human with those that (or that which) define(s) personhood.
Ilona, you're right about an insidious, creepy utilitarian view toward humans that can take over society's thought. Just look at embryonic stem-cell research.
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Bonnie, at 11:05 PM
Res, thanks for your thoughtful comment.
Some have said that a person who has lost all cognitive ability is no longer a person and therefore not worthy of being kept alive by artificial means. There’s been discussion regarding “personhood” as an ethical criterion for whether persons such as Terri should be “let go.” Some of this can be found in links in this post.
Interestingly, Judge Greer did not dispute Terri’s personhood; he referred to her as an “incapacitated person.” Of concern to him was proof that she did not have “hope of ever regaining consciousness and therefore capacity,” or “a reasonable probability of recovering competency." He found “overwhelming credible...unrebutted evidence” for this.
You make a very good point about personhood being founded in the imago dei. However, rhetorically speaking, especially “outside of the faith,” this is a difficult concept to articulate. It’s elusive even “within the faith.” I can anticipate that, were we to define personhood this way, we’d run into all kinds of trouble trying to explain how a PV individual indeed exhibits the imago dei, especially since, at least in my limited understanding, part of that involves intelligence, or at least sentience, and therefore volition.
I did not state that only the fertile are persons; please see my comment above to Paul. I wanted to broaden the discussion of personhood and persons in a PVS, which, from what I’ve read, seems to have been centered on cognitive ability.
Your point about animals is a good one, though I would venture to say that we are ministers to each other as humans rather than stewards of each other, as we are of animals. We have been given dominion over the animals in a completely different sense than that of human authority. Even a person in a PVS (and I apologize for using that term; I understand that it’s offensive to some and I understand why. I just don’t have a better alternative at the moment.) clearly is most related, physically and spiritually, to another person than any animal is (in spite of what some, i.e., those of the PETA ilk, may tell you).
I’m not sure about personhood having an eternal nature, because clearly we do not remain human for all eternity. The physical part of us, which is part of our personhood – see Genesis 1:26 – does not live on. But I need a good philosopher to help me out here -- (Jeremy Pierce, are you reading?)
Thanks for the great discussion.
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Bonnie, at 11:20 AM
Marla, someone totally braindead can't even be kept alive with machines. Braindeath results in organismic death. PVS isn't the same thing. That just means the parts of the brain we think have something to do with conscious experience and higher thought have been liquified, which her MRI does seem to have confirmed. I'm not sure we should be so sure that conscious experience needs that part of the brain, however.
Ilona, a lot of people make the distinction between those who aren't persons in a way that we can do anything to them and those who aren't persons that aren't that way. Animals, for instance, aren't persons, but we can't do whatever we feel like to animals. If the reason is that it might lead us to do bad things to persons, then the same applies to former persons. There's also the issue of dignity and respect for the former person, who once was a person after all. That's why we might consider it immoral to treat someone's body with disrespect, even though it's not a person. That might require at least some things with Terri Schiavo among those who don't consider her to have been a person all those years.
Paul and re ipsa, it was pretty clear that she saw reproduction as a sufficient condition for personhood, whereas you're claiming her argument requires it to be a necessary condition. She never said that, and her argument doesn't require it. She's not saying only reproducing things are persons. She's saying all reproducing things are persons. That can't be right, because a snail isn't a person, but maybe she means all reproducing humans.
Bonnie, I do think the way you've stated things can't be what you mean. A rock exists, but it's not a person, so existence can't be sufficient for personhood. Sperm and egg banks show why reproduction can't be a sufficient condition either, as Martin said. The most modification that seems most obvious to me would be human existence, but even that's not enough, because my fingernail is human. My suggestion is that being a living human organism is sufficient for personhood, though not necessary if we continue to exist as persons after we die, as I think is the biblical position. (Does that answer what you were asking for by calling upon me?)
Given that, Terri Schiavo is still a person and never hasn't been since she began to exist. The question to ask, then, is whether it's correct to point at her body in the PVS state and say "That's Terri Shiavo. The person Terri Shiavo still exists in that form." Some Christians have said no.
Paul, as to your last comment, much of the debate was over whether the court had been given enough evidence to support the claim that she had consented to this. If I were the judge, I wouldn't have found the evidence conclusive.
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Jeremy Pierce, at 3:01 PM
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